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Interview: Guillermo Ungo, Salvadoran Leftist Presidential
Candidate, Leader Of Revolutionary Democratic Front (fdr)
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department:  General
Published:  Friday, December 9, 1988
[Summarized below are highlights from a recent interview by Pensamiento Proprio with Guillermo
Ungo, presidential candidate of the Democratic Convergence and leader of the Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR). The interview appeared in a 12/06/88 report by the Regional Coordination
for Economic and Social Research of Central America and the Caribbean (CRIES, Managua).]
Q. What will happen...if the regime continues to reject dialogue or a political solution to the
war? Ungo: The war will be prolonged and intensify. However, at present there is no political
solution nor military solution to the war. But, in the course of one or two years there are more
possibilities for a political solution than a military one. The strength demonstrated by the FMLN
in the military sphere and the deterioration of the government's counterinsurgency and political
projects makes negotiation more viable. In addition, on inheriting a failed policy, (US President
George) Bush will promote tactical changes...and this will open up new possibilities. Q.: The FMLN
speaks as well of the possibility of an popular insurrection. Do conditions for an insurrection
exist? Ungo: Insurrections are not manufactured, nor decreed. The FMLN is committed to creating
an insurrectional situation. The FDR is not involved in this push although we do not deny the
possibility that an insurrection may occur. Instead, our work is focused on a political solution,
which option is not negated by the FMLN...[T]here is not necessarily a contradiction between an
insurrectional situation and a political solution... Q.: How do you reconcile political participation
and electoral campaigning with the FMLN's military offensive? Ungo: We are living a dialectic or
various dynamics... To have elections in the midst of a war is a most abnormal thing, but this has
already occurred four times [in El Salvador]. The democratic character of an election is not entirely
foreclosed, despite conditions of war and other factors related to the anti-democratic and repressive
structure of power. Here we are having elections in the midst of war and escalating repression.
Paradoxically, we simultaneously political spaces and initiatives for peace...are expanding, becoming
stronger. We are also beginning to see some indications of a national consensus. In practical terms,
only the oligarchic sectors openly reject a peaceful solution. Even ARENA has to formally express
its preference for a negotiated solution, albeit these expressions are presented in such a way as
to be empty of content. The war affects us [the FDR, and parties pertaining to the Democratic
Convergence], and we are targets of intimidation, insults, lies and blackmail. The army high
command uses a variety of slander against us, in the hope that we will break off our political alliance
with the FMLN, and in the attempt to portray us as responsible for all the guerrillas' military
actions. The army's strategy has a high political cost and presents enourmous risks for us. Moreover,
such strategy spills over and contaminates others, that is, people do not follow us because they
know we are subjects of persecution and attack by the military hierarchy. On the other hand,
this same correlation of forces benefits us in that we are tolerated and respected because of the
enormous political costs to the military and the oligarchy if they openly attack or persecute us.
Next, a certain type of actuation by the FMLN "negatively" affects us, such as when they place
bombs in political party offices, when they threaten or realize military actions against civilians
or civilian government employees... Q.: What is your evaluation of the alliance with the FMLN?
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Ungo: There are radicalized popular sectors who do not consider us an option for membership or
direct affiliation, but they do join with the FDR in several types of actions. Next, the incorporation
of moderate sectors strengthens us in the first place, because we are autonomous, but can also
benefit the FMLN. the FMLN has developed in the past year, aside from simple identification
of commonalities and differences. At present, it is an alliance with greater differences and more
profound commonalities than before. Our electoral participation corresponds with this scheme: it
was a decision not completely shared by the FMLN, but accepted and respected. The decision was
not made with them...
-- End --
